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Current ejection seat certified aircrew weight ranges (136 to 213 lbs.), such as for 
the F/A-18, prohibited over one third (38%) of women and (8%) of men from 
accessing the naval aviation strike pipeline (carrier-based aviation) between 
2008 and 2013. This is deleterious to the Naval Aviation Enterprise to restrict 
access of otherwise qualified and talented applicants to the strike aviation 
pipeline due to an outdated anthropometric survey based specification. The 
acceptable level of risk that was utilized by the Naval Aviation Systems 
Command was overly conservative and needs to be updated to align with current 
operational risk management principles, actual ejection seat performance mishap 
data and the naval aviation anthropometric population. This research is a deep 
exploration of all aspects of this issue and makes recommendations that can be 
used by Commander of Naval Air Forces in establishing an operational weight 
limit for all ejection seat aircraft. 
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This capstone project aims to conduct an in-depth look at the Naval 
Aviation Enterprise Pipeline Selection Process (NAEPSP). Specifically, the intent 
is to identify current ejection seat restriction criteria, which limit the selectable 
population to those individuals weighing between 136 and 213 lbs. The 
consequence of these criteria is that they prohibit over one third (38%) of women 
and (8%) of men from accessing the naval aviation strike pipeline (carrier-based 
aviation). This is deleterious to the Navy to restrict access of otherwise qualified 
and talented applicants to the strike aviation pipeline due to an entirely arbitrarily 
assigned limitation based on anthropometric values that are overly conservative 
for ejection seat performance specifications and do not align with the current 
Naval Aviation population.  
The methodology for the assessment is modeled after Hendricks’s five 
steps of systematic approach for analyzing work systems, Table 1 (Hendrick and 
Kleiner, 2002). For the purpose of this assignment, the specific Area of Interest 
(AOI) that has been identified and analyzed is that of personnel selection, which 
is step one in Hendricks’s model. 
Table 1.   Assessment and Intervention 
Step Hendrick’s Steps 
(Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002, p. 
19) 
Intervention 
1 Recommend the design 
modifications to the overall 
work system 
Alter/eliminate the ejection seat criteria for the 
pipeline personnel assignment process. 
2 Review existing job/system Review and critique personnel subsystem; 
Discuss existing ejection seat weight limits, 
based on population trends from decades ago, 
fail to reflect changing demographics. Address 
organizational implications of failure to update 
the ejection seat weight ranges. 
 2 
3 Review related human-
system interfaces 
Review ejection design specifications by  
aircraft, manpower, personnel, training, 
anthropometric surveys and studies, hazard 
risk assessments, mishap data, engineering 
investigation reports 
4 Determine if steps 1, 2, 3 are 
congruent 
Review available information and 
documentation (policy, test data, case studies, 
mishap data, etc); review literature/research 
and relate findings to intervention to support 
congruence assessment. 
5 Recommend how to modify 
those that are not 
Discuss data/findings that show weight limits 
can be broadened to include significantly more 
aviators, both female and male, without 
compromising ejection safety. Recommend 
changes to make carrier aviation more 
congruent with the psychosocial environment 
of the relevant external environment (an 




II. OVERVIEW OF THE NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE 
PIPELINE SELECTION PROCESS  
 The NAEPSP is depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Reading the figure 
from right to left shows the impact of the current ejection seat limits on the 
personnel selection process.  Start with the final fleet aircraft (F-18,) and then 
move left along the yellow path to the first selection point.  The T-45 aircraft 
depicted next to the blue diamond has a set of weight limits (136 - 213 lbs). 
Continue to follow the path to the left until the next selection point (T-6),), which 
is where all naval aviation students begin flight training, and it also has a set of 
weight limits (103 - 245 lbs.). Currently, in order for a student to progress to the 
right along the yellow strike pipeline path, they must meet a minimum Navy 
Standard Score (NSS), otherwise known as your flight school g.p.a., of 50 during 
flight training, as well as be anthropometrically compatible (to include weight) 
with any and all training aircraft and at least one of the final fleet aircraft.     
 
Figure 1.  Naval Aviator Pipeline Diagram 
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Figure 2.  Naval Flight Officer Pipeline Diagram 
 Early in the accession process, naval recruitment/selection sources 
ensure that accurate anthropometric measurements of prospective Naval 
Aviators/Naval Flight Officers are determined and recorded.  This early screening 
results in early identification of individuals with possible anthropometric 
incompatibilities with naval aircraft. NAVAVSCOLSCOM (API on Figures 1 and 2) 
is the Anthropometric Program Model Manager for anthropometric 
accommodation and the official source of and standard for all individual 
anthropometric measurements. The anthropometric measurements completed by 
NAVAVSCOLSCOM serve to determine if there are any functional aircraft 
restrictions for candidates. These measurements are then used by the Chief of 
Naval Air Training (CNATRA) for student pipeline selection and assignment.  
Individuals who are anthropometrically incompatible with aircraft may 
submit a waiver request as early as practical during flight training to avoid 
delaying pipeline selection. The current Naval Aviation Anthropometric 
Compatibility Assessment (NAACA) report must be included with the request. 
Requests are submitted to the approving authority in writing via the chain of 
command with endorsement by CNATRA Chief of Staff as follows: (1) For Navy 
personnel: Submit request to Naval Personnel Command (PERS-43); (2) For 
Marine Corps personnel: Submit request to Commandant of the Marine Corps 
(CMC), Deputy Commandant for Aviation (ASM). 
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Since the consequences of assigning an anthropometrically incompatible 
crewmember to an aircraft can be both costly and potentially catastrophic, 
waivers are not granted to Naval Aviation/ Naval Flight Officer candidates. 
However, the focus of this capstone project is not functional disqualification; it is 
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III. FRONT END ANALYSIS 
Certified aircrew weight ranges for strike aircraft were established in 1964 
and arbitrarily set at 3rd through 98th percentile male as a basis for ejection seat 
design specifications. These weight limits were extracted from an anthropometric 
survey done by the U.S. Naval Air Engineering Center (NAEC-ACEL-533, 1965) 
shown in appendix A.  The survey was intended to be used by aircraft and 
personal flight clothing designers to develop future cockpits and operational 
clothing.  In that survey, 96 different body measurements were taken on each of 
the 1,549 naval aviators (roughly 10% of population) who participated.  At the 
time of the survey, the naval aviation population was entirely male. Therefore, all 
early naval aviation anthropometric standards were based solely on the male 
anatomy and systems also were designed and built to those standards). 
Modern ejection seats are required to provide the widest possible escape 
‘envelope’ - that is the range of aircraft speed, height and attitude flight conditions 
under which it is possible to successfully eject. They must also operate within 
stringent and mandatory physiological limits (loads, accelerations, etc.) that 
ensure the crew comes through the ejection process without injury. It is an 
unfortunate fact of life that these two fundamental requirements tend to conflict, 
i.e. an enlarged escape envelope can be achieved with greater 
accelerations/forces, while lower injury risk implies lower accelerations/forces. 
The task of the seat designer is therefore to address this dichotomy to achieve 
the best possible balance between performance and safety. Seat ejection 
performance is heavily driven by the combined weight of the ejected seat and 
occupant, not simply the weight of the occupant. The ejected weight governs the 
fundamental design requirements, such as propulsive thrust, propulsive impulse 
and imposed acceleration levels on the seat occupant. To meet the seat 
performance needs over such a large weight range without resorting to complex 
and expensive control systems is an extremely difficult requirement.  A number of 
design features have been incorporated into the seat specifically to meet these 
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requirements. For example, the initial ejection gun phase of an ejection causes 
the seat to be accelerated at a high rate from the aircraft. The direction of this 
acceleration is approximately along the occupant’s spinal column, so control of 
the magnitude of the acceleration is extremely important if injury is to be avoided. 
The ejection seat recovery sequence is essentially the same for all flight 
conditions, with the recovery parachute deployment time delay being 
automatically adjusted as required for the prevailing flight conditions, i.e. a faster 
sequence for a low altitude ejection than for higher altitudes. Following self or 
command initiation of the seat the following on-seat actions occur 
immediatelyand the ejection gun delay cartridges (if fitted) are initiated. The 
shoulder harness retraction unit is operated to position the occupant for ejection. 
After the time delay, the ejection gun is fired, ejecting the seat. The seat 
separates from the ejection gun at 36 inches of travel, typically occurring 0.15 
seconds after first seat movement. During the ejection gun stroke the aviator’s 
legs are actively restrained to protect against flailing when the seat is exposed to 
the air-stream. All seat / crew / aircraft interfaces, e.g. crew services, 
automatically disconnect as the seat ejects. The emergency oxygen supply is 
switched on. The under-seat rocket motor lights up as the seat separates from 
the ejection gun to continue the seat vertical acceleration. The drogue 
deployment unit initiator cable is dispensed as the seat ejects, becoming fully 
deployed and initiating the drogue deployment unit 0.03 seconds after ejection 
gun separation. The recovery parachute timer barostatic time release unit, 
(BTRU) is started as the seat nears the end of the ejection gun stroke. This timer 
runs for 0.70 seconds, minimum, extended with increasing sensed speed and 
altitude. At medium altitude, the deceleration under the drogue and automatically 
adjusts the recovery parachute deployment delay time, as required. After ejection 
gun separation the seat is free of the aircraft. Propulsion continues by means of 
the under-seat rocket motor. The rocket motor also rolls the seat and steers it 
towards the right (rear seat) or left (front seat) to aid post-ejection spatial 
separation of the two seat systems, thus eliminating post-ejection collision risk. 
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This rolling motion is also important for optimum zero/zero ejection performance. 
The drogue deployment unit is operated to forcibly deploy the stabilizing drogue 
into the air stream. The drogue is attached to the seat by a 4-point stabilizing 
bridle which holds the seat 'face into wind.'. The drogue both stabilizes the seat 
and aids aerodynamic retardation. At a time controlled by the BTRU the recovery 
parachute is deployed. Simultaneously, the drogue and bridle are disconnected 
from the seat. Finally, all crew restraint connections are released and the seat 
falls away. The occupant retains the survival kit, which is attached to the 
parachute harness. If fitted and armed, the distress radio beacon is automatically 
activated by seat-crew separation. While descending under the recovery 
parachute the crew may steer the parachute. The survival aids container lowers 
on its lanyard automatically, if so selected before or during flight. After landing 
the crew releases the parachute. The parachute is fitted with water pockets to 
prevent dragging after water entry if the crew does not, or cannot for any reason, 
release the parachute. Life raft inflation can be initiated either manually or 
automatically during descent or after water entry. 
 
Figure 3.  Ejection Sequence 
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The primary injury mechanism for light aircrew is the acceleration during 
the drogue stabilization phase that becomes progressively higher as airspeed 
increases (Figure 4).  Smaller aircrew reduces the seat/occupant moment-of-
inertia in all three axes.  This allows the seat/occupant combination to yaw more 
prior to drogue bridle line stretch.  The rapid yaw correction that occurs when the 
drogue chute becomes effective can result in injury since the body’s ability to 
tolerate acceleration loads is weakest in the lateral axis.  Lightweight aircrew will 
have a high risk of spinal injury during ejections above 300 KEAS.   
 
Figure 4.  Approximate Risk of Major Spinal Injury versus Ejection Airspeed 
The primary injury mechanism for heavier aircrew is the possibility of  
impacting the aircraft’s vertical stabilizer(s) during the initial ejection phase 
(Figure 5), the seats inability to reach a sufficient height in order to deploy the 
parachute during a zero/zero ejection and the injuries sustained when impacting 
the ground during a parachute descent (Maximum suspended weight = aircrew 
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Figure 5.  Vertical Tail Clearance for Maximum Mass Aircrew  
 
Figure 6.  Vertical Height and Forward Throw of Maximum Mass Aircrew 
(achieve proper parachute inflation and descent rate) 
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Figure 7.  GQ-5000 Parachute Descent Rate  
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IV. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
A. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS 
In 1973, the Secretary of the Navy announced the enrollment of women 
into Naval Aviation and the first female, LTJG Barbara Allen, earned her wings of 
gold.  Over the years, the female aviation population increased. Finally, in 1993, 
the first female strike pilot climbed into the cockpit of the F-14 Tomcat.  The USN 
currently has over 750 (500 pilots, 288 NFOs) qualified female aviators. The 
number of female pilots and NFOs has risen in recent years, albeit much more 
slowly than in the surface warfare community.  
Figure 8.  Women in Naval Aviation Since 2000 
Not only has the number of female aviators in naval aviation increased in 
the past decades, so too have the overall dimensions of our male aviators.  In a 
survey conducted by US Army NATICK Solder RD&E Center (Technical Report 
NATICK/TR-09/014) in 2009, anthropometric measurements of a sample from 
the current army aviation population (3,462 subjects) were compared to a nearly 
identical survey from 1988.  It was determined that the 3rd percentile male weight 
measurement remained relatively the same, whereas the 98th percentile 
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measurement increased by 26 lbs.  The increase in the upper limit of the male 
range, in conjunction with the lower weight range due to the increase in the 
female population, has expanded the overall force demographics substantially 
(109 – 256 lbs.).  
Even though no official USN aviation population survey has been 
conducted since 1964, it is reasonable to surmise that a similar expansion in the 
USN population has occurred just as it has in the USA population.  Unfortunately, 
the pipeline selection process has not been revised accordingly, but is still 
constrained by the original certified weight ranges, meaning that individuals 
outside the range (less than 136 or greater than 213 pounds) cannot pursue the 
strike pipeline. Most notably, the limits for the majority of the USN’s current strike 
aircraft still match the survey weight measurements from 1964.  
  
Figure 9.  Various Military Anthropometric Surveys from 1964 to 2013, showing 
weight data of USN (1964) and overall USA males and females 
(various, 1984, 1988, 2009). 
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B. TECHNOLOGY 
To address the expanding range of the body types and to satisfy the 
political desire to allow the greatest number of candidates, both male and female 
of all ethnicities, to be eligible, the US services re-defined the acceptable crew 
size/weight limitations for the Joint Primary Aircraft Training System (JPATS) in a 
way that is more representative of real crew. Seven ‘multi-variant’ body size 
cases have been defined that, as a group, encompass a much larger proportion 
of the population than the previous percentile method. Each of the 7 cases is 
given a descriptor, such as ‘Shortest reach with highest shoulders’ and ‘Longest 
limbs’.  
 
Figure 10.  U.S. Military Anthropometric Cases 
In addition to size, the required crew weight range was also substantially 
increased. For example, previously the required crew weight range was typically: 
• 136 - 213 lbs. nude (boarding weight range was typically 174 - 259 lbs.). 
For the JPATS program the range was originally set at: 
• 116 - 245 lbs. nude (boarding weight range 137 - 271 lbs.) 
 16 
This range was subsequently extended further for JPATS and also for the 
NASA T-38 crew escape upgrade program, to 103 - 245 lbs. nude (boarding 
weight range 123 - 271 lbs.).   
Despite the fact that discrimination was not the original intent of the 
limitation, it is nonetheless a side effect of the current selection process that 
persists to this day. The lower limit of 136 lbs. effectively eliminates 38% of all 
females who enter naval aviation from ever selecting the strike pipeline.  Further 
and equally important, 1.3 % (106 aviators) of males are also eliminated from the 
strike pipeline on the basis of their (relatively) underweight condition: six percent 
of male aviators are also disqualified for being over the upper limit of 213 lbs.  
That six percent is primarily made up of former athletes coming from the Naval 
Academy or other major universities across the country.  Since 2008, that 6% 
translated to 749 males versus the 702 females who were excluded for being too 
light.   
 
Figure 11.  Ejection Seat Certified Weight Ranges, in green. Red shows the 




An area of concern for naval aviation and for USN senior leadership 
revolves around the point of diversity.  It is possible to perceive the 
consequences of the weight limit restriction as gender and possibly ethnic 
discrimination; even though it was not the original intent when the 
specification/certification was applied. At the time the weight study was 
conducted the naval aviation population was predominantly Caucasian males.  
The integration of women into the military has been met with a range of 
controversy and opinion, both historically and currently. Recent efforts, however, 
have attempted to highlight the range of benefits of including women at all levels 
and all branches of the military. Lau and Murnighan’s (1998) analysis of the 
literature showed that groups with low levels of diversity tend to form fault lines 
more readily compared to groups with comparatively high levels of diversity. 
Carnegie Mellon and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) conducted 
research on collective intelligence and found that a group’s collective intelligence 
tends to increase as the percentage of women in the group increases. Their 
research also found that groups with more women tended to have a more even 
communication distribution pattern, suggesting that adding women can 
strengthen an organization (Haring, 2013, p. 27-28). 
Other countries have been noted to view women in the military with less 
scrutiny than the USA.  In a 2005 study of female combatants, Israeli 
commanders reported that women “exhibit superior skills” in 1) discipline and 
motivation, 2) maintaining alertness, 3) shooting, 4) managing tasks and 
organization, and 5) displaying knowledge and professionalism in weapons use. 
Similarly, the Canadians, who have been fully integrated since the 1980s, report 
there are no negative effects on operational performance or team cohesion due 
to the presence of women in combat units (Haring, 2013). Other work shows it is 
possible to form teams of more diverse composition that develop greater 
interdependence and engagement, which can in turn aid in the cultivation of 
‘rapid trust’ amongst members; these could improve group processes and 
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functioning, and by extension, overall effectiveness (Rousseau et al, 1998; 
Wageman, 1995). 
A relative dearth of diversity amongst naval aviators selected in the strike 
pipeline can potentially affect team effectiveness. Cannon and Bowers (2011) 
assert that heterogeneity may be advantageous for high-difficulty tasks; since 
team composition is considered an important contributor to team effectiveness. 
An increase in women in the strike aviation pipeline will likely provide an 
instrumental contribution to both critical and creative thinking, collaboration, and 
decision making; skillsets that are currently underutilized and unrealized within 
the gender constraints imposed by the current ejection seat weight limits.  In light 
of this perceived gender discrimination, the disqualification of a large percentage 
of women based on an arbitrary and outdated weight is  incongruous, and this 
apparent incongruity needs to change to align better with the stated goals and 
values of the Navy. 
D. HIGHER PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
In order to select the strike pipeline, students need to achieve and 
maintain a minimum Navy Standard Score (NSS),of 50 or greater for USN and 
53 for USMC. The NSS is the equivalent of a GPA, but for flight training.  It is 
comprised of classroom, simulator and flight event scores.  NAE students who 
meet the minimum score may list strike as one of their pipeline selection choices.  
Students who do not reach the minimum score are not eligible and will not be 
considered for the strike pipeline.  No other pipeline has this requirement.  As 
long as a student completes primary flight training they are eligible for all other 
pipelines.   
This NSS score requirement has never officially been validated.  However, 
during interviews with a training specialist with over 20 years of experience it was 
revealed that it has been internally reviewed by several different CNATRA 
Aerospace Experimental Psychologists (AEPs) over the years. During every 
investigation, AEPs found that students who finished primary flight training with a 
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score of 60 or higher completed the strike pipeline with zero percent attrition.  
However, when they looked at the average NSS of those students who failed to 
successfully complete the strike pipeline, they found that as score decreased 
from 60 towards 50, the attrition rate increased to well above acceptable levels.   
 
Figure 12.  Strike Student Attrition Rates by Navy Standard Score 
The USN strike pipeline is the longest flight training pipeline and therefore 
the most expensive.  In order to maximize the taxpayers’ dollar, the attrition rate 
is optimized to keep washout rates below 8%.     
E. FOCUS 
The purpose of this capstone project is to conduct an assessment of the 
NAEPSP system, focusing on the personnel selection issue. This effort is built 
upon inquiries to specific questions: a) Why are certified seat weight ranges out 
of alignment with the aviation population? and b) What needs to change in order 
to expand the operational ranges and make the system (personnel selection) 
congruent with its environment (the population)?  
The goal is to find the root causes of the area of interest and recommend 
specific solutions to expand the operational weight range for ejection seats.  To 
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date, no one has raised the issue and presented the relevant information to the 
Chief of Naval Air Forces (Three-star, a.k.a. The Air Boss) in order to make a 
final operational decision. Although these areas of interest focus primarily on 
engineering, design, and testing, this document also focuses on identification of 
system features in need of correcting the relevant HSI domains (Manpower, 
Training, Occupational Health, Safety, Environment, Habitability, and 
Survivability) that can be applied to positively affect personnel selection.  
This personnel selection process is intended to ensure that candidates 
selected for strike aviation training are best suited to the array of tasks they will 
face, and to address the flaws in the selection system that unnecessarily 
eliminate people on the basis of characteristics that truly do not pose as great of 
a safety risk as originally thought by the engineering community. The HSI 
approach for the NAEPSP is based upon the idea that organizational benefits are 
most likely to be achieved through focus on the people (Booher, 2003). I will also 
make strategic recommendations to improve and optimize the system to achieve 
operational efficiency without compromising the working environment for the 
NAE.   
F. CONSTRAINTS 
The applicability of HSI is subject to the sociotechnical system complexity, 
and external and internal NAE constraints will limit the options available. Only a 
few factors constrain this assessment. Mainly the collection of the historical 
documents associated with anthropometric surveys and mishap data.  However, 
several constraints play a major role in whether or not this intervention will be 
successful in making a change in the selection process:  
1.  Inconsistent and outdated USN Anthropometric Policy. 
2.  Lack of anthropometric knowledge at commands with waiver authority. 
3.  Limited amount of test and live ejection data at weights outside the 
current certified limits 
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4.  The defensive posture of the USN engineering community. 
(Department that tests and certifies ejection seats) 
5.  Properly addressing leaderships concerns for aircrew safety. 
6.  Aircrew misconceptions about certified ranges and the USN waiver 
policy. 
7.  The engineering communities understanding of fleet waiver authority. 
8.  Leadership’s understanding of seat design specifications and the 
probability and severity of injury associated with ejections. 
9.  Misconceptions of the probability of ejections per 100,000 flight hours.    
10. Poor communication between Engineering and Engineering Safety 
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V. BREAKDOWN OF THE NAEPSP WORK SYSTEM 
The NAEPSP is a “work system” (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002, pp. 1-2) and 
consists of the following commands: 
1.  Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) 
2.  Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) 
3.  Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) 
4.  Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) 
5.  Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) 
6.  Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) 
7.  Naval Aviation Schools Command (NAVAVSCOLSCOM) 
8.  Squadron Commanding Officers 
Commander Naval Air Forces (CNAF) serves as the anthropometric 
program policy coordinator and NAVAVSCOLSCOM is the program manager. 
Coordination with Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), Bureau of Naval 
Personnel (BUPERS), Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED), Chief of Naval 
Air Training (CNATRA) and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) is 
essential to the success, effectiveness, and applicability of the program. CMC 
supports program implementation within the Marine Corps to ensure 
anthropometric compatibility of Marine Corps Aeronautically Designated 
Personnel upon initial assignment after completion of instruction at the Naval Air 
Training Command and when considering individuals for transition/conversion 
training thereafter.   
NAVAIRSYSCOM serves as an advisor to CNO and CNAF on 
anthropometric issues.   They manage the overall Aircrew Anthropometric 
Engineering Program. This includes determining the scope of naval aircraft 
requiring anthropometric measurements, the resources required to measure 
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aircraft crew stations, analyzing and developing anthropometric measuring 
procedures, identifying anthropometric restriction codes and crewmember weight 
restrictions, and developing and managing an anthropometric measurement 
certification program.  NAVAIR is also responsible for keeping anthropometric 
restriction codes current by updating dimensional data as modifications to 
existing aircraft and/or aircrew clothing/equipment occur, or as new aircraft are 
introduced.  
CNATRA ensures anthropometrically compatible pipeline assignments of 
student Naval Aviators/Naval Flight Officers to current inventory of training and 
pipeline aircraft.  This command ensures anthropometric coding and copies of 
the student's Anthropometric Data Measurement Record are entered as part of 
the student's Aviation Training Jacket and Naval Air Training and Operating 
Procedures Standardization (NATOPS) jacket, respectively.  The NATRACOM 
supports the entire accession decision process, through the use of technical 
guidance and provide assessment of anthropometric compatibility for prospective 
Naval Aviators/Naval Flight Officers.  CNATRA refers to BUPERS(PERS-43) or 
CMC(ASM) respectively, for disposition prior to commencing any further aviation 
training, those Navy or Marine Corps students not capable of being assigned to 
two or more pipelines. 
CMC(ASM)/BUPERS(PERS-43) ensure that prospective aviators meet 
aviation anthropometric entrance standards, coordinate with CNATRA to ensure 
compatible initial assignments of newly aeronautically designated personnel, and 
ensure Aeronautically Designated Personnel receive assignments to 
anthropometrically compatible aircraft.  
BUMED trains/indoctrinates Aeromedical Safety Officers, Flight Surgeons 
and Enlisted Aeromedical technicians and contractors in the processes, 
procedures, and techniques for accurate anthropometric evaluations.  They 
enforce policy set by NAVAVSCOLSCOM to ensure that anthropometric 
measurements taken at Navy Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) are accurately 
recorded for all prospective Naval Aviators/Naval Flight Officers seeking 
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aeronautical designation. This information is recorded in the Naval Aviation 
Anthropometric Compatibility Assessment (NAACA) database as part of the 
prospective Naval Aviators/Naval Flight Officers medical examination and 
forwarded to NAVAVSCOLSCOM for review.  The MTF is responsible for 
anthropometric measuring equipment.  It should be available, standardized, 
properly maintained, and utilized. Accession sources refer all NAE candidates to 
qualified MTFs for full anthropometric measurement whose stature categorizes 
them as "measurement required".  
Table 2.   Accession Candidates’ Stature “Measurement Required 
 
Individuals whose physical characteristics are anthropometrically 
compatible with requirements are eligible and can be offered contracts for 
selection to attend training as a student Naval Aviator or student Naval Flight 
Officer. 
Student aviators must meet published anthropometric and weight 
requirements (103 - 245 lbs.) prior to commencing Aviation Preflight 
Indoctrination.  Official anthropometric measurements are taken no more than 
two different times while assigned to NAVAVSCOLSCOM. Students may be 
afforded safe weight gain/loss training time to meet primary training aircraft (T-6) 
weight requirements of (103 - 245 lbs.  Any student who remains outside of 
weight limits and/or body fat composition requirements per USN/USMC physical 
fitness standards are not permitted to transfer for follow-on flight duty and may be 
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recommended for attrition. Foreign national students are also held to U.S. Navy 
anthropometric requirements and body fat composition requirements. 
Unless a weight waiver was previously granted, Student Naval Aviators 
and/or Student Naval Flight Officers must meet weight restrictions on the day of 
selection to be eligible to select a specific pipeline. The Squadron Commanding 
Officer ensures the following are annotated in the CO’s comments section of the 
Summary Selection Record: 
 Student weight  
 Aircraft restrictions based on student’s current weight  
 Any waivers for anthropometric/weight incompatibilities 
At this point, any student who does not meet the weight ranges for the 
next aircraft in the training pipeline is restricted from pursuing that pipeline. 
Upon reaching the fleet, Commanding Officers are responsible for 
ensuring that aviators suspected of an anthropometric incompatibility are referred 
to the squadron flight surgeon or local Aeromedical Safety Officer for 
anthropometric evaluation. However, the CO does so at the risk of losing an 
important asset and potentially ending that individual’s aviation career as a strike 
pilot. 
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VI. STEP TWO: REVIEW OF EXISTING JOBS 
The second step of the assessment is to review existing USN doctrine and 
policies to develop an understanding of the system’s selection process.     
A. NAEPSP JOB DESCRIPTIONS 
The job descriptions for each member of the NAEPSP system can be 
found below in Table 3.   
Table 3.   NAEPSP Job Descriptions 
Position Job Description References 
Naval Aviator 
Found to be of no significance 
with regards to this 
assessment 
 (OPNAVINST 3710.7U) 
Naval Flight 
Officer 
Found to be of no significance 





Found to be of no significance 
with regards to this 
assessment 
  (OPNAVINST 3710.7U) 
B. NAEPSP TASKS 
Routine tasks performed by naval aviators, naval flight officers, and 
aeromedical professionals were identified and found to be of no significance with 
regards to this assessment. The tasks performed by aircrew at 103 lbs. are no 
different than that of one at 136 lbs.  As long as a minimum weight (103 lbs.) 
individual is anthropometrically compatible in all other areas (i.e. sitting height, 
thumb tip reach, sitting eye height, butt to knee length), then tasks remain the 
same. However, if individuals are not compatible in those functional areas, we do 
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not propose allowing them to select the strike pipeline in order to meet a diversity 
shortfall. 
C. NAEPSP KSAS 
Knowledge, skills, and abilities for naval aviators, naval flight officers, and 
aeromedical professionals were identified and found to be of no significance with 
regards to this assessment.  The KSAs for a 103 lbs. individual are no different 
than those for another at 136 lbs.  Similarly, as long as the 103 lbs. individual is 
anthropometrically compatible in all other areas (i.e. sitting height, thumb tip 
reach, sitting eye height, buttock to knee length), the KSAs remain the same.    
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VII. STEP THREE: REVIEW HUMAN-SYSTEM INTERFACES 
The third step of the assessment was to examine the system components 
that relate to personnel selection. The work system breakdown and the review of 
the anthropometric process, engineering documentation, operational policy and 
training command pipeline selection process were vital in order to understand the 
strengths and shortfalls of the selection process. This knowledge enabled insight 
to the three major sociotechnical system elements that interact and affect optimal 
work system functioning: (1) the technological subsystem, (2) personnel 
subsystem, and (3) relevant external environment (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002, p. 
45). 
The human system interfaces that are most relevant to NAEPSP include 
the manpower and personnel domains, as these are the areas most affected by 
the proposed assessment. Training would be another consideration, to help 
improve performance of squadron teams that will be changed as a result of this 
intervention. Salas et al.’s review of teamwork research shows that teams who 
train together perform better (2008). 
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VIII. STEP FOUR: CONGRUENCE 
The fourth step in the assessment is to determine if the design 
modification is congruent with the selected personnel, the job, and tasks the 
personnel are required to do, and the human-system interfaces the personnel 
interact with.  Human factors engineering and operational policy are the areas 
that have been identified within the constraints of the project that require a 
congruence validation. The order in which these congruence validations are 
conducted matters.  
A thorough seat design and performance analysis to include USN 
mishap/ejection data is a critical first step that will provide an accurate picture of 
the ejection seat capabilities. A review of all efforts to improve seat performance 
should also be conducted. If performance improvements are found, then they 
should be converted into cost estimations and retrofit time impacts to training and 
operations. Once those are complete, then training and operational commanders 
need to determine if the money and time are worth spending.  Two concurrent 
hazard risk assessments should be conducted: the first to determine the risk 
associated with low end weight (below 136 lbs.), and the second for high end 
weight (above 213 lbs.).  Finally, all governing policy for anthropometrics and 
operational limitations regarding the physical attributes of aircrew must be 
reviewed thoroughly to identify shortfalls and inconsistencies.  
A. HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
An in-depth review of human factors engineering documents found that 
the original design specification for the Navy Aircrew Common Ejection Seat 
(NACES) was based on a 1964 anthropometric survey, which was the best 
anthropometric data available at the time with which to aid in development and 
testing of ejection seats. The engineering test and certification process was 
followed properly with regard to the development, test, and certification of the 
NACES ejection seat.  However, there were inconsistencies found in the rate of 
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injury compared to the risk standard that is used by the USN engineering 
community (Figure 8) as compared to the risk predictions of the USAF 
engineering community (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 13.  USN NACES Injury Risk Chart 
 
Figure 14.  USAF NACES Injury Risk Chart 
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Upon review of the available ejection seat risk predictions and ejection 
event injury data for similar aircraft, it became clear that the USN standard for 
acceptable injury rates is more conservative compared to actual injuries 
sustained by mishap aircrew (Figure 10).   
 
Figure 15.  USN Injury Data, airspeed vs. nude mass. 
Plotted USN mishap data more closely resembles USAF acceptable injury 
envelopes, which is to say that the available evidence does not support the 
USN’s stricter standard. This insight should help address leadership concern with 
regard to aircrew safety.  Of particular note, the data includes a T-45 event in 
which a female who weighed very close to 100 lbs. ejected from the aircraft. The 
only injuries she sustained were scratches and abrasions from landing in a 
mesquite tree.   
B. SYSTEMS IMPROVEMENT ANALYSIS 
In the engineering community's defense, it is evident that NAVAIR realized 
fairly early in the seat development pathway that the seat weight range limit was 
far too narrow to address the expected future USN demographic; a two phase 
pre-planned product improvement (P3I) engineering proposal for larger 
 34 
parachutes to reduce parachute descent rates and delayed drogue shoots to 
help stabilize seats and reduce possible neck injuries (P3I Phase II) was created. 
A lumbar adjustment was also developed (P3I Phase I) and eventually funded 
and implemented in order to address proper knee position and rudder reach to 
prevent leg injuries during the initial ejection phase. Unfortunately, the most 
expensive improvements (P3I Phase II) for the seat that addressed the 
expansion of the weight range never received proper funding. In ensuing years, 
the issue was raised by the fleet at various Aircrew System Enabler requirements 
group meetings, but failed to receive an endorsement for funding due to the 
strong support and confidence in the current ejection seats capabilities, the low 
probability of an actual ejection taking place (Average = 2:100,000 flight hours) 
and the cost associated with the proposed engineering solution (nearly a $50M 
project). As a result, the fleet demanded that NAVAIR conduct hazard risk 
assessments for weights above and below the certified range for the NACES.   
C. HAZARD RISK ASSESSMENT (HRA) ANALYSIS 
Several HRAs were conducted in 2012 and 2013, and found that all 
necessary safety concerns were properly addressed for both lower weight (neck 
injuries due to reduced levels of muscle strength associated with smaller 
individuals) and higher weight (acceptable aircraft clearance during initial ejection 
phase and parachute descent rates) ranges. In both cases, NAVAIR systems 
safety experts rated the risk of ejection injuries as medium.  Per DODI 5000.02, 
low to medium risks can be acknowledged by the appropriate fleet representative 
and accepted at the program manager level. The lower and upper weight ranges 
were acknowledged and accepted accordingly.   
This risk acceptance effectively expanded the allowable ejection seat 
weight range but did not change the certified weight range, which is from 103 - 
245 lbs.  Unfortunately, this information has never been directly shared with the 
fleet, nor was it published. During the same time period, a similar HRA was 
performed to assess risk associated with lower weight aviators while wearing the 
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Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS). Even though it is not a required 
piece of equipment to operate the T-45 or the F/A-18, it is widely used to support 
the strike mission as a lethal weapons delivery system. The certified weight 
range for that helmet matches the current certified seat range solely because an 
individual cannot utilize the helmet without flying in an aircraft that has the 
NACES. 
D. ANTHROPOMETRIC AND OPERATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS 
Upon review of several USN Anthropometric and Operational policies, I 
have found numerous inconsistencies and fleet misinterpretation of published 
weight ranges, waiver policies, basic definition of terms, varying weight standards 
for applicants compared to students and winged aviators, lack of weight 
monitoring and enforcement programs. The most alarming was the published 
certified weight ranges in the OPNAVINST 3710.7 series that referenced the 
appropriate NAVAIR instruction, which is the only official list of certified ranges 
for all military aircraft, but included a table that contradicts the NAVAIR reference. 
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IX. STEP FIVE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
RECOMMENDATION 1: Conduct a review of anthropometric data and 
pipeline selection data. 
 Compile all NAACA data, current measurement data and pipeline 
selection data 
 Determine how many of the 38% of females who did not qualify for 
the strike pipeline because of weight did qualify based on 
performance.  
 Determine how many of the 6% of males who did not qualify for the 
strike pipeline because of weight did qualify based on performance. 
RECOMMENDATION 2: Conduct an anthropometric policy working group 
meeting. 
 Gather all of the stakeholders listed in USN anthropometric 









All T/M/S Program Managers with ejection seats 
 
 Modify and align all governing documents that concern ejection 
seat weight limitations.  Policy needs to be made very clear to the 
fleet in order to prevent further confusion on weight limits and 







NAVAVSCOLSCOM INST 3710.37B 
All T/M/S NATOPS Manuals – flight manuals 
 
RECOMMENDATION 3: Conduct an anthropometric survey of the current 
naval aviation population. Data from this assessment will establish a range that 
better reflects the current naval aviation population.  
 Have all naval aviation population measured during next 
annual flight physical. 
 Gather Naval Aviation Anthropometric Compatibility 
Assessment (NAACA) Data from Naval Aviation Schools 
Command. 
RECOMMENDATION 4: Conduct a pipeline selection survey to better 
characterize the existing selection system. 
 Request all pipeline selection data from Chief of Naval Air 
Training. 
 Break down the racial and gender demographic 
 Determine how many flight students qualified for the strike 
pipeline but did not receive a strike pipeline assignment ??. 
 Determine how many students were selected for strike but 
did not list strike as their number one choice.  
 Determine how many students who qualified for the strike 
pipeline actually listed strike as their number one choice.   
RECOMMENDATION 5: Survey the fleet. 
 Survey female and male strike pilots/NFOs to determine 
satisfaction levels of pursuing that particular pipeline. 
 Survey Commanding Officers to determine satisfaction 
levels with their junior officers.   
 Determine if any gender-related anthropometric issues exist 
in aviation life support systems in modern carrier aviation 
squadrons(i.e. boots, gloves, helmets, flight suits, armor) 
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RECOMMENDATION 6: Request body composition information data 
 Request body composition assessment information from the 
USN and USMC physical fitness assessment program office. 
 Last five years’ of weight data from all ejection seat 
squadrons 
  Determine how much of the fleet is actually outside the 136 
- 213 lbs. certified range to establish the impact on readiness 
and production if the weight limit as it exists were enforced.   
RECOMMENDATION 7: Collectively gather all the information referenced 
in this paper. Develop a summary document consisting of all the material 
references and argument made here, including the information gathered from 
recommendations 1 through 6. 
RECOMMENDATION 8: Investigate and the certified range of the Joint 
Helmet Mounting Cueing System. Based on similar findings in this intervention 
the same arguments can be made for the certified range for JHMCSs. 
RECOMMENDATION 9: Request CNAF Safety to task NAVAIR systems 
safety with completing HRAs for all other platforms with seats (ejection and 
crashworthy) that have certified weight ranges. 
RECOMMENDATION 10: Present this information and the results of the 
NAVAIR systems safety HRAs to the Chief of Naval Forces (CNAF). Request 
that CNAF establish an operational weight range (103 - 245 lbs.) for all platforms 
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X. EXPECTED OUTCOMES 
If the body of evidence gathered here is presented to Commander Naval 
Air Forces in a clear and unbiased manor, I am confident that an operational limit 
for the strike pipeline of 103 to 245 lbs. will be established.  If so, this will allow 
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XI. CONCLUSIONS  
This assessment discussed reduced diversity as a possible unintended 
side effect of outdated personnel selection process applied to the population of 
strike aviators in the US Navy. The outdated weight-specific selection criteria 
eliminated a significant percentage of the female population from eligibility for 
duty as aviators on a carrier-based strike team. This investigation determined 
that this phenomenon is at odds with the broader goals of a 21st-century Navy, 
and arguably limits its effectiveness. Through review and analysis of available 
literature, documentation, and process/procedures related to the sociotechnical 
work system, support and recommended strategy for revision of the criteria was 
developed to bring the system into congruence.  If these findings and 
recommendations are successfully translated and implemented, it will produce a 
change in operational policy that will assist in improving the selection process 
within NAEPSP system and will increase the quality and quantity of qualified 
personnel eligible for the strike pipeline. Opening the naval aviation strike 
community by making it accessible to greater numbers of qualified candidates 
will also increase the diversity of the Navy overall, and presumably enhance its 
ability to select, build, and develop carrier strike squadrons that are more 
capable, effective, and suitable for its changing missions. 
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A. U.S. NAVAL AIR ENGINEERING CENTER (NAEC-ACEL-533, 1965) 
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